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APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO FILE AS AMICI CURIAE 
Pursuant to California Rule of Court 8.200(c), Airbnb, Inc., IAC/InterActive 
Corp, Google, Inc., LinkedIn Corp., Reddit, Inc., and Twitter, Inc. (collectively 
“Amici”) request leave to file the attached brief as amici curiae urging reversal. 
Airbnb, Inc. (“Airbnb”) provides an Internet platform through which persons 
desiring to book accommodations, and persons listing unique accommodations 
available for rental, can locate each other and enter into direct agreements with 
each other to reserve and book travel accommodations on a short and long-term 
basis.  Airbnb’s North American headquarters are located in San Francisco, 
California. 
IAC/InterActiveCorp (“IAC”) is a diversified online media company with 
more than 150 brands and products.  IAC’s businesses are leaders in numerous 
sectors of the Internet economy.  Many of these businesses, including Match.com, 
OkCupid, Ask.com, The Daily Beast, and Vimeo, provide users with the ability to 
post, search for, and view a wide variety of user-generated content.  IAC’s family 
of websites receive more than 2.5 billion visits each month from users in over 200 
countries. 
Google Inc. (“Google”) is a technology company whose mission is to 
organize the world’s information and make it universally accessible and useful.  
Google offers a variety of web-based products and services—including Search, 
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Gmail, Maps, and YouTube—that are used around the world.  Google’s search 
engines process trillions of searches every year.  Google’s Gmail Service provides 
email for more than 1 billion users.  Google Maps is used by more than 1 billion 
people each month.  YouTube has over a billion users, with users uploading 400 
hours of video onto the site every minute.  Google Inc.’s headquarters are located 
in Mountain View, California. 
LinkedIn Corp. (“LinkedIn”) hosts the world’s largest professional network, 
with over 450 million members worldwide and over 130 million members in the 
United States.  LinkedIn’s mission is to connect the world’s professionals to enable 
them to be more productive and successful.  LinkedIn’s headquarters are in 
Sunnyvale, California. 
Reddit, Inc. (“Reddit”) operates the reddit.com platform, which is a 
collection of thousands of online communities attracting over 260 million monthly 
unique visitors that create, read, join, discuss and vote on conversations across a 
myriad of topics.  Reddit is based in San Francisco, California. 
Twitter, Inc. (“Twitter”) operates a global platform for self-expression and 
communication, with the mission of giving everyone the power to create and share 
ideas and information instantly.  Twitter’s more than 300 million active monthly 
users use the platform to connect with others, express ideas, and discover new 
information.  Hundreds of millions of short messages (known as “Tweets”) are 
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posted on Twitter every day.  Twitter has headquarters in San Francisco, 
California. 
Amici have a substantial interest in the legal rules governing whether 
providers of interactive computer services may be subjected to lawsuits for alleged 
harms arising from content posted by third parties on their platforms.  Since they 
serve as platforms for communication among billions of users, amici have been 
and will continue to be parties to lawsuits in which they are immune from liability 
under Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230 (“Section 
230”).  The success of amici’s businesses—and the vitality of online free speech 
that these businesses support—depends on their being shielded from the risks, 
burdens, and uncertainty of lawsuits that seek to hold them liable for harms 
allegedly arising from tortious content originated by their users or other third 
parties. 
Amici rely on the settled interpretation of 47 U.S.C. § 230 granting broad 
immunity to online intermediaries for harms arising from third-party content.  The 
robustness of this immunity has been recognized by courts across the country, and 
the trial court’s order threatens to erode this settled interpretation.  If allowed to 
stand, the order would contravene Congress’s policy choices and introduce 
substantial uncertainty to a law that has been crucial to the growth and success of 
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the Internet, and has become a prerequisite for the provision of services upon 
which the public has come to rely.1 
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     HALE AND DORR LLP 
1875 Pennsylvania Avenue NW 
Washington, DC 20006 
(202) 663-6000 
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950 Page Mill Road 
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1 Pursuant to California Rule of Court 8.200(c)(3), counsel certify that this brief 
was authored solely by attorneys for amicus curiae; no party contributed either to 
the authorship or the financing of the time spent on the brief or the out-of-pocket 
expenses connected with the filing. 
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BRIEF OF AMICI CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF APPELLANT 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Amici respectfully urge reversal of the trial court’s order finding that 
California right of publicity claims fall outside the broad scope of Section 230’s 
immunity.  Section 230 grants interactive computer service providers—like 
Appellant Facebook and amici here—broad immunity against claims for alleged 
injuries resulting from online content created by third parties.  The trial court held 
that Jason Cross a/k/a Michael Knight (“Knight”) nonetheless could seek to hold 
Facebook liable for failing to remove third-party content that Knight found 
objectionable.   
The trial court’s decision was premised in part on the erroneous conclusion 
that Section 230’s exception for intellectual property claims includes Knight’s 
state-law right of publicity claims and his derivative Unfair Competition Law 
(“UCL”) claim.  While also supporting Facebook’s additional grounds for reversal, 
Amici submit this brief to address the ways in which the trial court’s decision 
departs from existing Section 230 case law and, absent reversal, would threaten a 
fundamental legal protection on which the Internet industry depends.   
The court’s decision unjustifiably departs from Ninth Circuit precedent 
holding that Section 230’s intellectual property exception includes only federal 
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intellectual property claims.  The trial court also ignored well-established 
precedent in the California appellate courts, the Ninth Circuit, and other federal 
courts of appeal blocking efforts, like Knight’s, to artfully plead around Section 
230 immunity.   
The trial court’s order, if upheld, would invite a combination of forum-
shopping and artful pleading that could largely eviscerate the protections of 
Section 230.  Upholding this order would provide plaintiffs in California state 
courts a roadmap to pursue exactly the sort of claim that prompted Congress to 
enact Section 230 and that Congress most clearly intended to foreclose in enacting 
Section 230:  a claim against an interactive computer services provider based on 
allegedly defamatory content posted by third-parties to an online platform.  And it 
would threaten to deprive service providers of resources that are essential to the 
vitality of their businesses and the Internet by forcing them to choose between 
generating advertising revenue and preserving Section 230 immunity.  Under the 
court’s reasoning, a platform could lose Section 230 immunity if it generates 
advertising revenue by displaying an advertisement next to third-party content that 
includes a person’s name or likeness.  The specter of litigation and liability would 
undermine the growth and development of the Internet that Congress enacted 
Section 230 to promote.  The court’s decision disregards Section 230’s text, 
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frustrates congressional intent, contradicts settled precedent, and should be 
overturned. 
ARGUMENT 
Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act (47 U.S.C. § 230) broadly 
“immunizes providers of interactive computer services against liability arising 
from content created by third parties.”  (Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando 
Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC (9th Cir. 2008) 521 F.3d 1157, 1162 (en banc).)  
The powerful protection afforded by this immunity is plain on the face of the 
statute.  It commands that “[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer service 
shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another 
information content provider.”  (47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1).)  And it expressly preempts 
State and local law that violates that command, mandating that “[n]o cause of 
action may be brought and no liability may be imposed under any State or local 
law that is inconsistent with this section.”  (Id. § 230(e)(3).)  Given the expansive 
reach of this language and the important interests at stake (see infra Part III), state 
and federal courts all across the country have consistently—and for more than two 
decades—“treated § 230(c) immunity as quite robust.”  (Carafano v. 
Metrosplash.com, Inc. (9th Cir. 2003) 339 F.3d 1119, 1123; see also Barrett v. 
Rosenthal (2006) 40 Cal.4th 33; Zeran v. America Online, Inc. (4th Cir. 1997) 129 
F.3d 327.) 
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Knight’s right of publicity claims and derivative UCL claim clearly fall 
within the ambit of this protection.  Because Section 230 prohibits claims that treat 
interactive computer services providers as “publisher[s]” of third-party content, it 
bars any claim that turns on whether a service provider exercised a “traditional 
editorial function” with respect to the torrent of third-party content that flows 
through its networks, including “reviewing, editing, and deciding whether to 
publish or to withdraw from publication” any content created by users of its 
service.  (Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc. (9th Cir. 2009) 570 F.3d 1096, 1102.)  That is 
precisely what Knight’s claims seek to do.  His claims seek to hold Facebook liable 
for hosting content created solely by Facebook users that allegedly used Knight’s 
name and likeness to criticize Knight and his business practices.  (1 AA 10 ¶ 11; 1 
AA 15 ¶ 31.)2  According to Knight, Facebook is liable not because Facebook 
created this content (it did not), but because Facebook failed to remove the content 
(1 AA 13-14 ¶¶ 23-26; 1 AA 16 ¶ 34; 1 AA 17 ¶¶ 38, 42) and displayed 
advertising (also created by third-parties, not Facebook) adjacent to that content 
(1 AA 10 ¶ 11).  Deciding whether to remove content created by third-parties is a 
quintessential publisher decision.  Such a decision lies at the very heart of what 
                                           
2 “AA” refers to Appellant’s Appendix here and throughout this brief. 
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Section 230 protects.  (See Barnes, supra, 570 F.3d at p. 1103.)  Knight’s claims 
attacking such decisions must therefore be dismissed.       
In this Court, Knight disputes none of this analysis.  (Respondents’ Br. at 
15-18.)  Instead, he argues that his right of publicity claims and derivative UCL 
claim fall within an exception to Section 230 for laws “pertaining to intellectual 
property.”  (See 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(2) [“Nothing in this section shall be construed 
to limit or expand any law pertaining to intellectual property.”].)  That argument 
fails for two independent reasons.  First, Ninth Circuit precedent and the text and 
purposes of Section 230 make clear that Section 230’s intellectual property 
exception applies to only federal intellectual property laws, not the state law claims 
at issue here.  Second, Section 230 prohibits exactly the sort of artful pleading on 
which Knight relies:  courts routinely reject efforts to evade Section 230 by 
dressing up a defamation claim as some other claim that superficially appears to 
fall outside the scope of the statute.  For both these reasons, Section 230 requires 
that this case be dismissed in its entirety.   
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO RECOGNIZE THAT ONLY 
FEDERAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW IS EXCEPTED FROM SECTION 
230 IMMUNITY  
As the Ninth Circuit held in Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, the term 
“intellectual property” in subsection 230(e)(2) refers to federal intellectual 
property law, not state law.  (See supra (9th Cir. 2007) 488 F.3d 1102, 1118-1119; 
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see also People v. Superior Court (Moore) (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1202 [federal 
appellate court decisions are “persuasive and entitled to great weight.”])  
Subsection 230(e)(2) was enacted alongside three other provisions that also create 
certain narrow exceptions from Section 230 immunity.  (See 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(1), 
(3), (4).)  These provisions share two common features.  First, each provision 
defines the outer-boundary of its exception based on nationally-uniform federal 
law.  Second, to the extent that each provision permits enforcement or application 
of state law, it cabins that permission within the boundary that federal law 
establishes.   
Thus, for example, subsection 230(e)(4) permits continued “application of 
the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986”—a federal law—as well as 
“any similar State law.”  (Italics added.)  Subsection 230(e)(3) likewise allows 
“any State” to continue “enforcing any State law” but only if it is “consistent with 
[Section 230]”—again, a federal law.  (Italics added.)  And subsection 230(e)(1) 
permits “enforcement” of certain enumerated federal criminal laws “or any other 
Federal criminal statute,” but does not permit enforcement of any state criminal 
laws, let alone state criminal laws that reach beyond the scope of federal criminal 
statutes.  (Italics added.)  These features reflect Congress’s judgment that while a 
handful of specifically identified federal interests should co-exist with the federal 
 11 
 
 
policies embodied in Section 230, those interests should in no way undermine the 
uniform application of Section 230 throughout the country.   
Fundamental principles of statutory construction require that subsection 
230(e)(2) be interpreted in a way that is consistent with these neighboring 
provisions.  (See United States v. Williams (2008) 553 U.S. 285, 294 [“[A] word is 
given more precise content by the neighboring words with which it is associated.”]; 
Gustafson v. Alloyd Co. (1995) 513 U.S. 561, 575 [applying the principle of 
“noscitur a sociis”—“a word is known by the company it keeps”]; see also Smith v. 
United States (1993) 508 U.S. 223, 233 [“Just as a single word cannot be read in 
isolation, nor can a single provision of a statute.”])  Applying this principle 
“avoid[s] ascribing to one [provision] a meaning so broad that it is inconsistent 
with its accompanying [provisions].”  (Gustafson, supra, 513 U.S. at p. 575.)  That 
is particularly important here, where the provision at issue is a statutory 
“exception,” which must be read “narrowly in order to preserve the primary 
operation of the [statute].”  (See Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Clark (1989) 
489 U.S. 726, 739; see also Goddard v. Google, Inc. (N.D.Cal. Dec. 17, 2008) 
2008 WL 5245490 at *5, fn.5 [subsection 230(e)(1) creates only a narrow 
exception from Section 230 immunity].)  
Interpreting “intellectual property” in subsection 230(e)(2) to encompass 
state intellectual property laws, as the lower court did here, would violate these 
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well-established interpretive principles by allowing plaintiffs to pursue otherwise-
barred claims that sweep well beyond the bounds of federal intellectual property 
law.  As this case illustrates, state right of publicity law protects interests that 
federal intellectual property law does not.  “Intellectual property” under federal 
law aims exclusively to “promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,” (U.S. 
Const., art. I, § 8, cl. 8), and “ha[s] little to do with protecting feelings or 
reputation,” (Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co. (1977) 433 U.S. 562, 573; 
see also Garcia v. Google, Inc., (9th Cir. 2015) 786 F.3d 733, 745 (en banc) 
[holding that federal copyright law does not redress injuries to reputation]).  The 
right of publicity, by contrast, is “deeply rooted in offense to person, to acts that 
caused ‘pain and mental stress.’”  (Dogan & Lemley, What The Right Of Publicity 
Can Learn From Trademark Law, (2006) 58 Stan. L. Rev. 1161, 1170-1171.)  The 
same is true of many other state laws that nominally purport to protect “intellectual 
property.”  “Such laws … bear various names, provide for varying causes of action 
and remedies, and have varying purposes and policy goals.”  (Perfect 10, supra, 
488 F.3d at p. 1118.)  Exempting state “intellectual property” claims from Section 
230 immunity would thus swerve from the pattern established by the three other 
provisions of Section 230(e)—none of which, as noted, permit state law claims that 
have no analogue in federal law. 
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Section 230’s expressly enacted “[f]indings” and “[p]olicy” reinforce the 
conclusion that subsection 230(e)(2) exempts only federal intellectual property 
law.  The preamble to Section 230 recognizes that the Internet has “flourished, to 
the benefit of all Americans, with a minimum of government regulation,” and 
announces a national policy of promoting “the continued development of the 
Internet” “unfettered by Federal or state regulation.”  (47 U.S.C. § 230(a)(4), 
(b)(1), (2) (Italics added).)  “[P]ermitting the reach of any particular state’s 
definition of intellectual property to dictate the contours of this federal immunity 
would be contrary to Congress’s expressed goal of insulating the development of 
the Internet from the various state-law regimes.”  (Perfect 10, supra 488 F.3d at p. 
1118.)  State intellectual property laws “vary widely from state to state” and “are 
by no means uniform.”  (Id. at pp. 1118, 1119 & fn.5.)  If the scope of Section 230 
were linked to this patchwork of state laws, the immunity of a defendant that 
operates throughout the country would turn on and off depending on the state in 
which a claim is brought.  And any state would be empowered to whittle away at 
the scope of Section 230 immunity simply by purporting to re-categorize one or 
more tort—perhaps even defamation—as one sounding in “intellectual property.”  
Moreover, uncertainty about the scope and characterization of each state’s laws 
would mean that “no litigant w[ould] know if [it] is entitled to immunity for a state 
claim until a court decides the legal issue.”  (Id. at p. 1119 fn.5.)  “As a practical 
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matter, inclusion of rights protected by state law within the ‘intellectual property’ 
exemption would fatally undermine the broad grant of immunity provided by 
[Section 230].”  (Ibid.) 
These concerns are especially acute for right of publicity claims.  Half the 
states recognize the right of publicity “in some form,” either at common law or by 
statute.  (1 J. Thomas McCarthy, Rights of Publicity and Privacy (2d ed. 2016 
update) § 6:1.)  While some states consider the right of publicity to be an 
“intellectual property” right, other states consider it a tort, rooted in principles of 
privacy.  (See, e.g., Gignilliat v. Gignilliat, Savitz & Bettis, L.L.P. (S.C. 2009) 684 
S.E.2d 756, 759; Montgomery v. Montgomery (Ky. 2001) 60 S.W.3d 524, 528).  
On top of that, each state’s right of publicity law protects a range of attributes.  
(Compare, e.g., Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 214, § 3A [covering the use of a 
person’s “name, portrait, or picture”] with, e.g., Ind. Code § 32-36-1-6 [extending 
to a person’s “name; voice; signature; photograph; image; likeness; distinctive 
appearance; gesture; or mannerisms.”]).  Tying the scope of Section 230 immunity 
to such a wide array of differing legal regimes would expose interactive computer 
services providers to the very uncertainty and disuniformity that Section 230 was 
designed to eliminate.   
The trial court analyzed none of these issues; indeed, it exempted Knight’s 
right of publicity claims from Section 230 immunity without conducting any 
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analysis at all and without so much as citing the Ninth Circuit’s contrary decision 
in Perfect 10.  (1 AA 328.)  And Knight has offered no persuasive argument for 
upholding this unreasoned conclusion.  He contends first that this Court should 
disregard the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning in Perfect 10 because “decisions within the 
Ninth Circuit do not bind California courts.”  (Respondent’s Br. at 16.)  But while 
the Ninth Circuit’s decision is not binding here, California courts “give great 
weight to federal appellate court decisions”—“particularly … in the context of 
their determination of federal law.”  (Adams v. Pacific Bell Directory (2003) 111 
Cal.App.4th 93, 97-98.)   
Moreover, as the California Supreme Court explained in this exact context, 
“[a]dopting a rule of liability under [S]ection 230 that diverges from the rule 
announced in [federal courts] … would be an open invitation to forum shopping by 
defamation plaintiffs.”  (See Barrett, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 58.)  Forum shopping 
certainly is a grave concern here.  Accepting Knight’s position would place 
California state courts directly in conflict with the law that binds federal courts in 
this jurisdiction.3  And because many interactive computer service providers 
                                           
3 Bound by Perfect 10, numerous federal district courts in California have barred 
plaintiffs from pursuing state-law right of publicity claims, as well as other claims 
brought under state intellectual property law.  (See, e.g., Joude v. WordPress 
Foundation (N.D.Cal. Jul. 3, 2014) 2014 WL 3107441 at *7 [right of publicity]; 
Evans v. Hewlett-Packard Co. (N.D.Cal. Aug. 15, 2013) 2013 WL 4426359 at *3 
[same]; Perfect 10, Inc. v. Giganews, Inc. (C.D.Cal. Mar. 8, 2013) 2013 WL 
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(including five of the six amici here) are based in California, California state courts 
may well be available even for claims that otherwise have no connection to 
California.  (See Daimler AG v. Bauman (2014) 134 S.Ct. 746, 760 [“With respect 
to a corporation, the place of incorporation and principal place of business are 
paradigm bases for general jurisdiction.” (internal quotation and alterations 
omitted)].)  Thus, even beyond the persuasive force of the Ninth Circuit’s 
reasoning, both comity and significant practical considerations counsel strongly 
against departing from the holding in Perfect 10. 
Knight also points to several other federal courts that, he claims, have 
disagreed with the Ninth Circuit and have held that Section 230’s intellectual 
property exception applies to both state and federal intellectual property claims.  
(Respondent’s Br. at 17-18.)  But neither appellate decision that Knight cites 
actually decided the question.  (See Almeida v. Amazon.com, Inc. (11th Cir. 2006) 
456 F.3d 1316, 1320-1324 [avoiding the question]; Universal Commc’n Sys., Inc. 
v. Lycos (1st Cir. 2007) 478 F.3d 413, 422-423 & fn.7 [addressing the issue in 
dicta, without any analysis]).  And the small handful of federal trial court cases that 
did reach the issue either (1) failed to grapple with the purposes underlying Section 
                                           
2109963 at *15 [same]; see also Free Kick Master LLC v. Apple Inc. (N.D.Cal. 
2015) 140 F.Supp. 3d 975, 983  [California trademark claim]; Parts.com, LLC v. 
Yahoo! Inc. (S.D.Cal. 2013) 996 F.Supp.2d 933, 938-939 [same].) 
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230, (e.g., Ohio State Univ. v. Skreened Ltd. (S.D. Ohio 2014) 16 F. Supp. 3d 905, 
918); (2) incorrectly rejected the premise that state intellectual property law varies 
widely from state to state, (see Doe v. Friendfinder Network, Inc. (D.N.H. 2008) 
540 F. Supp. 2d 288, 301-302 [erroneously asserting that state intellectual property 
laws impose no “materially greater burden” than federal intellectual property 
law]); or (3) exempted only state law claims that are analogous to claims available 
under federal intellectual property law and that therefore present fewer of the 
concerns detailed above, (see Atlantic Recording Corp. v. Project Playlist, Inc. 
(S.D.N.Y. 2009) 603 F. Supp. 2d 690, 704 [state copyright law]; Gucci Am., Inc. v. 
Hall & Assocs. (S.D.N.Y. 2001) 135 F. Supp. 2d 409, 416 [trademark 
infringement]; Malibu Media, LLC v. Weaver (M.D.Fla. Apr. 8, 2016) 2016 WL 
1394331 at *8 [copyright].)  None of these cases provides any persuasive reason to 
break with the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Perfect 10 or to disregard the clear text 
and purposes of the statute—all of which limit subsection 230(e)(2) to federal 
intellectual property law.   
II. THE TRIAL COURT FURTHER ERRED BY NEGLECTING TO LOOK THROUGH 
KNIGHT’S ARTFUL PLEADING OF WHAT IS IN ESSENCE A DEFAMATION 
CLAIM 
The lower court’s failure to reject Knight’s attempt to creatively plead his 
way around Section 230 independently requires reversal.  At their core, Knight’s 
claims are for defamation.  As Facebook thoroughly explains in its opening brief 
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(at 13-14, 39-41), Knight seeks to hold Facebook liable for allegedly false content 
critical of him, and allegedly damaging to his reputation, that was authored and 
posted by Facebook users.  (E.g. 1 AA 10 ¶¶ 12-13 [alleging that commenters 
posted “false and derogatory statements” about Knight].)  Permitting this case to 
proceed would thus allow Knight to pursue exactly the sort of claim that Congress 
most clearly intended to foreclose when it enacted Section 230:  a defamation 
claim based on online content created by third-parties.  Section 230 immunity, 
however, cannot so easily be evaded. 
Section 230 was enacted in response to a case holding an early online 
service provider potentially liable for an allegedly defamatory message posted by a 
user on one of its message boards.  (See Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. 
Co. (N.Y.Sup.Ct. May 24, 1995) 1995 WL 323710 [unpublished]; see also Barrett, 
supra, Cal.4th at p. 43 [detailing this history]; Roommates.com, supra 521 F.3d at 
p. 1163 [same].)  In Stratton Oakmont, the court found that the defendant 
“exercised sufficient editorial control over its computer bulletin boards to render it 
a publisher” and therefore ruled that the defendant could be held responsible for a 
defamatory message posted on the bulletin board.  (Supra, 1995 WL 323710 at *3-
4.)  The legislative history makes it crystal clear that one of Congress’s objectives 
in passing Section 230 was to ensure that Internet platforms be immunized from 
claims like those brought in Stratton Oakmont.  (See H.R. Rep. No. 104-458 
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(1996) at p. 194 [“One of the specific purposes of [Section 230] is to overrule 
Stratton-Oakmont [sic] v. Prodigy and any other similar decisions which have 
treated such providers ... as publishers or speakers of content that is not their 
own.”].)  Given this history, Section 230 has “been widely and consistently 
interpreted to confer broad immunity against defamation liability for those who use 
the Internet to publish information that originated from another source.”  (Barrett, 
supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 39.)   
Shortly after Congress enacted Section 230, courts recognized that if a 
plaintiff could evade the statute by simply relabeling a defamation claim under 
another theory of liability, then the broad protection Congress intended would be 
quickly eviscerated.  The Fourth Circuit confronted this issue in the first case to 
construe Section 230.  (See Zeran, supra, 129 F.3d 327.)  The plaintiff in that case, 
Mr. Zeran, sought to hold America Online liable under a negligence theory on the 
ground that it had “unreasonably delayed in removing defamatory messages posted 
by an unidentified third party, refused to post retractions of those messages, and 
failed to screen for similar postings thereafter.”  (Id. at p. 328.)  The Fourth Circuit 
quickly swept aside any notion that Section 230 might not apply because of how 
Zeran had labeled his claims: “Although Zeran attempts to artfully plead his claims 
as ones of negligence, they are indistinguishable from a garden variety defamation 
action.”  (Id. at p. 332.)  After addressing various other issues, the Fourth Circuit 
 20 
 
 
thus affirmed dismissal of Zeran’s negligence claims under Section 230.  (Id. at p. 
328.) 
Following Zeran’s lead, courts have uniformly rejected attempts to 
creatively plead around Section 230’s prohibition on claims that seek to hold a 
platform liable for defamatory speech initiated by a third party.  In Universal 
Communications Systems, for example, echoing the Fourth’s Circuit’s warning 
against “artful pleading,” the First Circuit held that Section 230 immunized Lycos 
against claims brought under a Florida securities law and a Florida cyberstalking 
law because these claims fundamentally sought to treat Lycos as the publisher of 
defamatory third-party content hosted on its platform.  (Supra, 478 F.3d at pp. 418, 
421-422.)  And the Sixth Circuit recently found Google immune under Section 230 
from causes of action “ranging from ‘libel’ to ‘invasion of privacy’” on the 
grounds that all these claims sought to hold Google liable for “merely providing 
access to, and reproducing, the allegedly defamatory text.”  (O’Kroley v. Fastcase, 
Inc. (6th Cir. 2016) 831 F.3d 352, 354-355, cert. den. (U.S. Jan. 9, 2017, No. 16-
6499) 2017 WL 69376; see also Gentry v. eBay, Inc. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 816, 
831-832 [holding claims barred by Section 230 notwithstanding appellants’ 
contention that they sought to enforce “eBay’s independent duty under the statute 
to furnish a warranty” because “[t]he substance of appellants’ allegations reveal 
they ultimately seek to hold eBay responsible for … content supplied by other 
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information content providers”]).  As the Ninth Circuit has explained, “what 
matters is not the name of the cause of action—defamation versus negligence 
versus intentional infliction of emotional distress.”  (Barnes, supra, 570 F.3d at pp. 
1101-1102.)  What matters is the claim’s essential nature.  If a claim is based on 
defamatory content created by third parties it must be dismissed—no matter how it 
is labeled. 
Knight’s right of publicity claims and derivative UCL claim constitute the 
same sort of artifice, and suffer from the same fatal defects, as the claims rejected 
in these prior cases.  Their essential nature is to try to impose on Facebook liability 
for allegedly defamatory third-party content posted on Facebook’s site by 
Facebook users.  Just as in Zeran, Knight’s right of publicity and derivative UCL 
claims “are indistinguishable from a garden variety defamation action.”  (Supra, 
129 F.3d at p. 332.)  Indeed, Knight first brought these claims under a defamation 
theory in Tennessee.  (1 AA 68-72.)  Only after Facebook successfully invoked 
Section 230 (1 AA 68-72), did Knight restyle his claims under a right of publicity 
theory in the present case.  Approving of Knight’s strategy would not only exalt 
form over substance, but also provide a roadmap that countless plaintiffs 
undoubtedly would follow to try to strip interactive computer services providers of 
an important immunity guaranteed to them under federal statute.  This Court 
cannot permit such blatant artful pleading and forum-shopping to “casually 
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eviscerate[]” “[Section 230] and its purpose of promoting the ‘free exchange of 
information and ideas over the Internet.’”  (Kimzey v. Yelp! Inc. (9th Cir. 2016) 
836 F.3d 1263, 1269 [quoting Carafano, supra, 339 F.3d at p. 1122].)  For this 
reason, as well, the decision of the trial court must be reversed. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT’S ORDER WOULD HAVE FAR-REACHING NEGATIVE 
EFFECTS ON AMICI AND OTHER PROVIDERS OF INTERACTIVE COMPUTER 
SERVICES  
The trial court’s order not only is incorrect, it also threatens to cripple the 
growth and development of the Internet industry, as well as the ability of numerous 
California-based businesses, including the amici here, to continue to provide the 
sort of free or low-cost innovative services for which the industry has become 
famous.  Such a result would directly contravene Congress’s purpose in enacting 
Section 230: “to encourage the unfettered and unregulated development of free 
speech on the Internet.”  (Batzel v. Smith (9th Cir. 2003) 333 F.3d 1018, 1027; see 
also Barnes, supra, 570 F.3d at p. 1099 [Section 230 is designed “to promote the 
free exchange of information and ideas over the Internet”]; Zeran, supra, 129 F.3d 
at p. 331 [“The specter of tort liability in an area of such prolific speech would 
have an obvious chilling effect.”].)   
When Congress enacted Section 230 “[i]nteractive computer services ha[d] 
millions of users” (Zeran, supra, 129 F.3d at p. 331)—and that number has now 
risen into the billions, due in part to the success of Section 230 itself.  Given the 
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“staggering” amount of information communicated by these users, Congress 
recognized that “[i]t would be impossible for service providers to screen each of 
their millions”—and now billions—“of postings for possible problems.”  (Ibid.)  
Fearing that service providers would “severely restrict the number and types of 
messages posted” if “[f]aced with potential liability for each message republished 
by their services,” “Congress considered the weight of the speech interests 
implicated and chose to immunize service providers to avoid any such restrictive 
effect.”  (Ibid.)    Thus, Congress “‘made a policy choice . . .  not to deter harmful 
online speech through . . . imposing tort liability on companies that serve as 
intermediaries for other parties’ potentially injurious messages.’”  (Carafano, 
supra, 339 F.3d 1119 at p. 1123 [quoting Zeran, supra, 129 F.3d at pp. 330-331]).  
Instead, Congress determined that only the actual creators of online content that 
causes harm should be subject to potential liability.  
Industry experience confirms the wisdom of this policy.  Section 230’s grant 
of immunity from liability has allowed services like those offered by amici to 
flourish, providing consumers with innovative (and often free) ways to connect and 
interact.  Affirming the trial court’s erroneous decision would undercut those 
advances and deter future innovation by weakening the protection that Congress 
provided.  The effects of such a decision would reach far beyond the facts in this 
case and impact a wide range of services that the trial court never considered.   
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As discussed above, affirming the trial court’s order would open the door to 
precisely the sort of claims that Congress had most in mind when it enacted 
Section 230—defamation claims seeking to impose liability on service providers 
for third-party content hosted on their platforms.  For example, rather than suing 
for defamation, the plaintiffs in Ricci v. Teamsters Union 456 (2d Cir. 2015) 781 
F.3d 25 (per curiam) and Jones v. Dirty World Entertainment Recordings LLC (6th 
Cir. 2014) 755 F.3d 398, could just as easily have brought right of publicity claims 
against GoDaddy and Dirty World, respectively, on the basis of those websites’ 
generating revenue from defamatory content about plaintiffs.  That is bad enough.  
But the consequences of such a decision could sweep even farther:  unleashing so-
called right of publicity claims that would seek to impose liability on service 
providers in a wide variety of situations that courts have previously held to be well 
within the scope of Section 230’s protection.  Indeed, many claims previously held 
to be barred by Section 230 could be refashioned as right of publicity claims and, 
under the lower court’s reasoning, subject providers to burdensome litigation and 
possible liability.  The plaintiff in Obado v. Magedson could have eluded dismissal 
of his invasion of privacy and intentional and negligent infliction of emotional 
distress claims against Yahoo and GoDaddy, among others, had he simply 
characterized them as right of publicity claims.  (See supra (3d Cir. 2015) 612 
F.App’x 90, 91-92.)  Similarly, the plaintiff in Hupp v. Freedom Communications, 
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Inc. could have avoided Section 230 immunity by seeking to hold the Orange 
County Register liable for user comments on its website under a right of publicity 
theory, instead of a breach of contract theory.  (See supra (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 
398, 404-405.) 
The logic of the lower court’s opinion would also threaten to starve Internet 
companies of the resources that have made it possible for them to offer a vast array 
of valuable services to billions of users, and to do so either free of charge or for 
fees that are far lower than the costs of providing those services.  According to the 
trial court, to show that Facebook commercially misappropriated Knight’s name 
and likeness, Knight need only establish that Facebook generated advertising 
revenue by placing advertisements next to pages on which Facebook’s users posted 
Knight’s image.  (1 AA 328.)  Under the district court’s opinion, then, merely 
generating advertising revenue would open an Internet platform to possible right of 
publicity liability—and, by extension, would jeopardize the platform’s immunity 
under Section 230.  Internet companies would be forced to choose:  Either expose 
themselves to potentially immense liability by continuing to sell advertisements, or 
forego that revenue in order to preserve Section 230 immunity.   
Imposing such a choice would be catastrophic—not only for Internet 
companies but also for the billions of users worldwide who would be deprived of 
online services if those companies could not reliably generate revenue from 
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advertising.  As is commonplace in the Internet industry (as well as in predecessor 
media such as newspapers, radio, and television), advertising revenue is a critical 
element of each of amici’s (as well as Appellant Facebook’s) business models.  
This exact concern has led courts uniformly to reject “creat[ing] a for-profit 
exception to [Section] 230’s broad grant of immunity.”  (M.A. ex rel. P.K. v. 
Village Voice Media Holdings (E.D.Mo. 2011) 809 F.Supp.2d 1041, 1050; see also 
Gentry, supra, 99 Cal.App.4th at pp. 816, 822, 828-831; Goddard, supra, 2008 
WL 5245490 at p. *3; Hinton v. Amazon.com.dedc, LLC (S.D.Miss. 2014) 72 F. 
Supp. 3d 685, 690 fn.9.)  And it should lead this Court to reverse the trial court in 
this case. 
In addition, affirming the lower court’s decision would undercut a principal 
objective of Section 230 immunity: “to protect websites not merely from ultimate 
liability, but from having to fight costly and protracted legal battles.”  
(Roommates.com, supra, 521 F.3d at p. 1175; see also Zeran, supra, 129 F.3d at 
p. 330 [Section 230 was designed to promote “freedom of speech in the new and 
burgeoning Internet medium” by eliminating the “threat [of] tort-based lawsuits”].)  
Having to litigate the merits of a litany of diverse state intellectual property law 
claims—even weak ones—would place a substantial burden on existing Internet 
services and deter the development of new ones.  The sheer volume of third-party 
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content hosted by companies like amici illustrates the burdens that such companies 
would face if the order were allowed to stand.  For example: 
• Airbnb hosts more than 2.3 million listings.  
• Vimeo, which is owned by IAC, hosts over 50 million videos that 
users view and comment on daily. 
• Google’s YouTube has over a billion users, with users uploading 400 
hours of video onto the site every minute.   
• LinkedIn has over 450 million members, with two new members 
signing up to join LinkedIn every second.   
• Reddit provides a platform for over 130,000 active communities that 
generate 64 million comments each month alone. 
• Twitter users send many millions of tweets per day. 
Amici’s services, and others like them, have revolutionized how people 
advertise goods, locate services, find employment, search for housing, 
communicate with friends, share opinions, and otherwise interact.  Section 230 
plays a critical role in keeping these services viable.  If service providers were 
faced with potential liability for every instance in which their role in hosting third-
party content that is critical of (or otherwise not to the liking of) someone else, or if 
protection from such liability depended on their not using advertising as a source 
of revenue, they might well be forced to limit what information can be shared on 
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their services, change the structure and operation of their online platforms, or even 
shutter some aspects of their services.  Section 230 is intended to prevent this very 
outcome. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the order denying Facebook’s motion to strike 
plaintiffs’ right of publicity claims, and the unfair business practices claim that 
turns on the right of publicity claim, should be reversed. 
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